how to fuck voters (and make a bundle)

the new york times has an interesting article (free registration required) about diebolds voting machines (33000 installed throughout the us to date), which are riddled with security flaws. in essence every pimply faced teenager with 100$ worth of computer equipment is capable in stuffing the ballot at his discretion.

our friends at /. have a heated discussion about the incident and the researchers, it security scientists of john hopkins and rice universities, have the actual research paper (pdf) at your disposal.

cool as it seams, e-voting is riddled with challenges. for example: how do you guarantee anonymity while providing full audit capabilities at the same time?

the somewhat laissez faire approach signified by a diebold spokesperson ("if there were problems with it, the code could have been rectified or changed") should make you wonder if such systems can ever be trusted. specifically since the code is not open to scrutinity by crypto researchers. (Mr. Richardson of Diebold said the company's voting-machine source code, the basis of its computer program, had been certified by an independent testing group. Outsiders might want more access, he said, but "we don't feel it's necessary to turn it over to everyone who asks to see it, because it is proprietary.")



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